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COMMENTS
THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY
INSTITUTE DECISION: WILL SINGLE-GENDER
EDUCATION SURVIVE?
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1996, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in United States v. Virginia.1 In
this case, the Court ruled that the Virginia Military Insti-
tute's ("VMI") male-only admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.2 Justice Ginsburg, for the majority, wrote that
Virginia had failed to provide an "exceedingly persuasive jus-
tification" for VMI's gender discrimination.3 According to the
Court, in order for a gender-based classification to be consti-
tutional, the state must show that it is substantially related
to the achievement of an important governmental interest.4
However, both Virginia and VMI failed to pass this so-called
"skeptical scrutiny" test.5
At approximately the same time that the Court made its
ruling in the VMI case, parents, community members and
school officials in Harlem, New York City were busy planning
the opening of an all-girls middle school to be known as the
Young Women's Leadership School (YTWLS").' This all-girls
school targets underprivileged female students who might
1. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Throughout this comment, this case is referred to
as either the "VMI decision," the "VMI case," or by its official case name.
2. Id. at 518.
3. Id. at 529.
4. Id. at 533.
5. Id. at 534.
6. Jacques Steinberg, Plan for Harlem Girls School Faces Concern over
Sex Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1996, at Al. The school opened on September 4,
1996. All Girl's School Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.
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benefit from attending a single-gender school designed to ad-
dress problems that girls often face in coeducational schools.7
For example, the YWLS emphasizes mathematics and sci-
ence, two subjects in which girls often lag behind boys.8 In
addition, classrooms are designed in ways that allow the
teachers to give each girl more personal attention.9
California has now entered the controversy over single-
gender education. Five million dollars has been set aside in
the state budget to fund the Single-Gender Academy Pilot
Program.'" The program allows up to ten school districts or
county education offices to receive $500,000 grants if they are
selected to participate by the California Department of Edu-
cation." However, unlike the YWLS and most other single-
gender schools around the country, California's single-gender
schools must abide by the three following rules: (1) if a school
for one sex is established, then another school for the other
sex must be opened; (2) both schools must provide equivalent
funding ($250,000 each), facilities, staff, books, equipment,
curriculum and extracurricular activities (e.g. sports); and (3)
although a single-gender school may be located on the cam-
pus of a larger co-educational school, it must be a complete
school, not solely a single-gender class or program.
Many educators, government officials, and parent groups
claim that single-gender schools are the answer to such
problems as high drop-out rates and poor academic perform-
ance. 2 Studies on single-gender education appear to confirm
these claims. 3 However, attempts to implement such pro-
grams have been met by strong opposition from civil rights
groups that believe single-gender education violates federal
statutory law and the equal protection doctrine.'" For exam-
ple, the YWLS is currently under investigation by the United
7. Steinberg, supra note 6, at Al.
8. Id. at B15.
9. Id.
10. Nanette Asimov, State Closer to Single-Sex Public Schools, S.F. CHRON.,
July 14, 1997, at Al.
11. Id. Nine counties and school districts applied to the California State
Department of Education for these grants. Id. Two were rejected, four are be-
ing reviewed for the Fall of 1998, and three have been accepted (one in Stock-
ton, another in Siskiyou County, and a third in San Francisco). Separating the
Sexes, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 7, 1997, at F4.
12. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
13. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
14. See infra Part II.A. 1-2.
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States Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights
("OCR"), based on a complaint from the New York Civil
Rights Coalition alleging gender discrimination. 5 After the
Supreme Court's ruling in the VMI decision, it is unclear
whether single-gender education is permissible under equal
protection doctrine, even when comparable facilities for both
sexes exist.
This comment begins with an objective summary of the
existing research and evidence on the effectiveness of single-
gender education in improving the academic performance of
women and urban minority males." This section reveals that
while most studies show that single-gender education is ef-
fective in improving academic performance, the evidence is
not entirely conclusive.'" The background section also pro-
vides an explanation of federal statutory, regulatory and case
law and their effects on the implementation of single-gender
programs in public schools.'8 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's rulings on single-gender education do not provide
enough guidance on exactly how single-gender schools may be
established and still pass constitutional muster. For exam-
ple, the Court has yet to rule on whether the establishment of
separate but equal single-gender schools for both genders
would validate an otherwise invalid single-gender program
which includes only one sex.'9 Furthermore, it is unclear
whether the Court would favor single-gender schools that
benefit women over those that benefit men.20 Additionally, in
the VMI case, the Court used ambiguous language which
may cause uncertainty as to what level of scrutiny will be
utilized in future gender discrimination cases.2'
In applying the current legal standard to the Young
Women's Leadership School, this comment concludes that
15. Somini Sengupta, East Harlem District is Considering an All-Boys Pub-
lic School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B9; Jacques Steinberg, Rights Groups
Seek to Bar Girls-Only School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at B2.
16. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
17. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
18. See infra Part II.B-E. This comment only deals with federal law. How-
ever, remedies are also available under state constitutions and statutes. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-122, PUBLIC EDUCATION: ISSUES
INVOLVING SINGLE-GENDER SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS 2 (1996) [hereinafter
GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION].
19. See infra Part IV.C.2.
20. See infra Part V.C.1.
21. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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unless boys are provided a substantially equal single-gender
school, the YWLS violates both federal statutory law and
equal protection doctrine.22 This comment proposes that the
Supreme Court adopt the three following principles in order
to resolve the uncertainty discussed above: (1) require sepa-
rate but substantially equal facilities for both genders;
(2) permit both all-boys and all-girls schools; and (3) elimi-
nate the ambiguous phrase "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" when ruling on future single-gender education cases (as
well as any other gender classification cases) because it only
engenders confusion as to what level of scrutiny applies to
single-gender schools.23 This comment concludes that these
measures are necessary in order to encourage more research
on and experimentation with single-gender education.24
II. BACKGROUND
A. Impetus for Single-Gender Programs
Single-gender educational programs are most often es-
tablished to improve the academic performance of females or
urban minority males. 5 Parts 1 and 2 of this section detail
the obstacles encountered by both of these groups in receiving
their education in coeducational schools. These parts also
describe why single-gender education is seen as a solution to
these problems. Finally, each part concludes that the avail-
able evidence regarding single-gender educational programs
seems to indicate that such programs are effective. However,
despite this indication, it is also clear that additional re-
search must be performed before this evidence will be conclu-
sive.
22. See infra Part IV.B.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part V.
25. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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1. Improving Academic Performance of Urban Minority
Males26
Studies show that, in general, boys outperform girls aca-
demically in coeducational settings.27 However, proponents of
single-gender education claim that urban males, particularly
minorities, face special problems that might be cured by all-
male schools.28 For example, at many urban coeducational
schools the drop-out rate for African American males is often
two or three times that of other racial groups29 and those who
stay in school tend not to perform as well academically as
members of other racial groups.3" Moreover, studies have
shown that African American males are subject to more dis-
ciplinary action in urban, coed schools than are other
groups.31 Other studies show that minority males tend to suf-
26. Throughout this comment, the term "urban minority males" generally
refers to African American males (as opposed to other urban racial groups),
given that most of the attempts at establishing single-gender schools for urban
males have been geared toward improving the status of inner-city black males.
See, e.g., Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(finding that the all-boys schools at issue were developed in response to the cri-
sis facing African American males in inner-city Detroit). These past attempts
to establish single-gender schools have addressed the particular problems that
their students face, in part, through measures relating to their race (e.g. an
Afrocentric curriculum), in addition to those relating to their gender. See infra
notes 35-43 and accompanying text. This comment does not address the legal-
ity or the efficacy of utilizing measures relating to race in such schools.
27. Roberta Tovey, Gender Equity: A Narrowly Gender-Based Model of
Learning May End Up Cheating All Students, HARV. EDUC. LETTER, July-Aug.
1995, at 4 (noting 1,000 studies on single-sex education done for the YMCA); see
also CORNELIUS RIORDAN, GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL: TOGETHER OR
SEPARATE? 110-11 (1990).
28. Audrey T. McCluskey, The Historical Context of the Single-Sex Debate
Among African Americans, 17 W.J. OF AFRICAN AM. STUD. 193, 195 (1993). Be-
sides all-male schools, other types of single-gender programs include set-aside
classrooms for male students, programs for different age groups, programs that
emphasize academic development, and others that focus on personal develop-
ment and cultural heritage. Id. at 196.
29. Id. at 195. In Milwaukee, which has a 26% African American male
population in its schools, the drop-out rate for African American males is 60%.
Id. The drop-out problem has implications beyond the fact that many children
are failing to receive a education. In Detroit, 60% of the drug offenses are
committed by high school dropouts, and 97% of the offenders are African
American males. Id.
30. Id. at 195. Studies of urban schools show that African American males
are the largest group assigned to special education classes. McCluskey, supra
note 28, at 195. At Milwaukee's schools, less than 20% of African American
males had a grade average of C or above. Id.
31. Id. African American males (26% of Milwaukee's public school popula-
tion) account for 50% of the suspensions in that city. Id.
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fer from low self-esteem. 2 Many experts believe that a stu-
dent's self-esteem is positively related to his or her academic
progress, such that poor self-esteem results in poor academic
performance.13 Proponents of all-male educational programs
point to these problems to emphasize the necessity for ex-
traordinary measures that will address the special needs of
young minority students.34
Most of the public single-gender schools that have been
established for urban minority males employ an Afrocentric
curriculum which centers around African history and cul-
ture.35 Notions of male responsibility and behavior inspired
by heroic African American figures such as Marcus Garvey
and Malcolm X (as well as male teachers and counselors) are
also incorporated.38  The assumption is that boys need the
presence of strong male authority figures in order to counter-
act the negative male influences that the young men may en-
counter on the streets.37 The male role models teach the boys
self-esteem and responsibility for self and others." These all-
male schools also stress traditional mainstream values such
as honesty, punctuality, grooming, manners and, especially,
32. RIORDAN, supra note 27, at 106-07.
33. Id. Related to self-esteem is the idea of environmental control or locus
of control. Id. at 107. Internal (versus external) locus of control refers to the
extent to which people perceive that they have control over their actions and
the consequences of those actions. Id. "Internals" are those people who believe
that they have some control over their destinies, while "externals" believe that
the outcomes of their actions are determined by factors extrinsic to themselves
(e.g., by fate, luck, or the "system"). Id. Like self-esteem, locus of control has
been shown to correlate positively to academic achievement. Id. Research
shows that minorities tend to be externally oriented. RIORDAN, supra note 27,
at 107.
34. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 195.
35. Id. at 196. Proponents of all-male academies for minority students view
the curriculum in the regular public schools as Eurocentric enclaves which
honor and perpetuate White male rule, and which have labeled African Ameri-
can male students as failures. Id. at 197. C. Scully Stikes, co-creator of Mil-
waukee's plan for establishing all-male minority schools, argues that White-
dominated schools fail to recognize "the African American learning style,"
which he says means "paying attention to how things are done, not just what is
done." Id.
36. Id. at 196. In August, 1991 Detroit opened three all-male academies:
the Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and Paul Robeson Academies, which together
enrolled a total of 425 African American, inner-city students. McCluskey, su-
pra note 28, at 196; see Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 n.4
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
37. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 196.
38. Id.
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discipline.39 Strict standards of behavior, dress codes, and
rules prescribing the type of haircut that is permissible are
uniformly enforced.4 °
These all-male academies also attempt to provide a
stimulating learning environment.4 They usually gear their
curriculums toward teaching math, science, technology and
English.4 These schools have more frequent student-teacher
contact, class sizes are usually smaller, teachers are selected
for their ability to teach African American boys, drills are
frequent and intensive, and students are encouraged to read
aloud and ask questions.43
Many educators are convinced that all-male academies
and other single-gender programs positively affect urban mi-
nority males.44 Unfortunately, the quantitative evidence
showing these effects is not conclusive. The most famous
studies are those done by Cornelius Riordan of Providence
College.45 His studies show that African American and His-
panic males (and females in general) who attend single-
gender schools have higher test scores and greater senses of
environmental control (i.e., tend to be more internally ori-
ented)"6 than their counterparts in coeducational facilities.47
However, Riordan admits that because these schools
tend to have more discipline and more interested students
and parents, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether the
single-gender setting alone is what positively affects students
at single-gender schools." It appears that single-gender
school effects are conditional and the key condition may pivot
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 197.
42. Id.
43. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 196.
44. See generally RIORDAN, supra note 27.
45. See generally id.; Cornelius Riordan, Single-Gender Schools: Outcomes
for African and Hispanic Americans, 10 RES. SOC. EDUC. AND SOCIALIZATION
177 (1994).
46. See supra note 33.
47. RIORDAN, supra note 27, at 112-13.
48. Riordan, supra note 45, at 198. Riordan attributes about 70% of these
differences to informal school variables such as parental interest, school disci-
pline, and youth values. Id. Moreover, Riordan also found that students in
single-gender schools do experience a decline in self-esteem, most likely due to
the higher academic demands and discipline levels. Id. at 197. Yet, he does not
believe that this loss of self-esteem is significant compared to the gains in feel-
ings of environmental control the students experience. Id.
11891998]
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on the notion of making a parent/student pro-academic
choice.49 Moreover, many experts believe that successful
strategies used in single-gender settings, such as smaller
classes and more individual attention, can be just as effective
in coeducational settings."
While the quantitative evidence of the effectiveness of
all-male schools is inconclusive, the qualitative, or anecdotal,
evidence is much stronger.5' Educators, parents, and stu-
dents have all reported positive effects of the all-male acade-
mies.5" Many believe that, at the very least, these schools in-
spire trust and cooperation between parents, teachers, and
students.5 3 Single-gender schools for minority males are also
hailed for providing minority groups a voice in the education
of their children.54
Furthermore, many educators believe that simply sepa-
rating boys from girls in the classroom (especially during the
middle school years) is an effective way in which to minimize
distractions that boys (not just urban minority boys), as well
as girls, cause and face every school day.55 For example, at
the Forty-Niners Academy in East Palo Alto, California,
classes were segregated by gender in Fall 1997 and since that
time, students, teachers, and school administrators have no-
ticed a significant decrease in distractions in the single-
gender classes. 6 The Academy's executive director, Michele
Murnane, reports that the boys "didn't have to talk back to
the teacher to show off in front of the girls." 7 Seventh-grader
Fabricio Albarez attested to the distraction that girls can
create for boys when he admitted that if "[a] girl is cute,
you're going to pay more attention to her" than a teacher.58
Another boy felt that an all-boys class facilitates open discus-
sion in certain sensitive situations." He stated, "When we
talk about body changes, we feel more open to asking ques-
49. Id. at 198.
50. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 6.
51. Id. at 4.
52. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 196-97. "He can hardly wait to go to
school," reports one mother of a student at an all-male academy. Id. at 196.
53. Id. at 198.
54. Id.
55. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 4.
56. Eve Mitchell, Rooms of Their Own, S.F. EXAM., Sept. 22, 1997, at A3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
1190 [Vol. 38
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tions because girls aren't around.""°
Regardless of whether or not all-male academies actually
benefit males, especially urban minority males, these schools
have been met by strong opposition, mostly from civil rights
organizations such as the NAACP."' Opponents argue that
such programs ignore the plight of minority females who face
gender discrimination in addition to race and class oppres-
sion.62 Moreover, the drop-out rate for African American fe-
males of lower socio-economic status is nearly as high as that
of African American males.6" Additionally, the academic
achievement of African American females is below their
grade level.64
Opponents have also argued that all-male programs for
urban minority students have the effect of stereotyping mi-
nority males as being low achievers and needing special
treatment.65 Opponents also express concern about the risk
of a separate and unequal allocation of education resources,
the fear being that all-female schools will get a smaller per-
centage than all-male schools.6
2. Improving Academic Performance of Females
As stated above, statistics show that, in general, females
do not perform as well academically as males in coeduca-
tional settings.67 Many coeducational schools are based on a
male developmental model, emphasizing individualism and
competition. 68 This model poorly serves girls who tend to per-
form better academically under a model which emphasizes
cooperative learning.69
60. Id.
61. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 196. Opposition has also come from the
federal government. Id. at 197. Lamar Alexander, former Secretary of Educa-
tion for the Bush administration, criticized all-male academies, noting that
parents who claim a right to send their children to such schools have argu-
ments quite similar to those used by White supremacists in justifying segre-
gated schools in the South during the middle of the century. Id.
62. Id. at 196.
63. Id.; see also GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 6.
64. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 196; see also GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION,
supra note 18, at 6.
65. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 6.
66. Id. at 4.
67. RIORDAN, supra note 27, at 110-11; Tovey, supra note 27, at 4 (noting
1000 studies on single-sex education done for the YMCA).
68. Tovey, supra note 27, at 4-5.
69. Id. at 5 (citing a 1991 study by Renee Peterson). In fact, research shows
1998] 1191
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Recent research suggests that female students defer to
males in coeducational classrooms, are called on less than
males, and are less likely to study advanced mathematics
and science.7" When girls do call out answers, they are often
admonished by their teachers (whether male or female) for
speaking out in class.71 The more recently published history
textbooks devote only two percent of their pages to women.72
Furthermore, research has shown that girls' lower scores on
standardized tests may be due, in large part, to gender bias
in the tests.73
Proponents of all-female schools and other single-gender
programs believe that single-gender settings will improve
girls' academic performance and attitude toward math and
science.' Single-gender schools and programs typically em-
phasize enhancing confidence, competence, and leadership
skills, as well as encouraging female students to pursue ca-
reers not traditionally female.75
Research on the subject shows that the proponents may
be right, at least regarding all-female colleges.7" Graduates of
these colleges are nearly twice as likely as women graduates
of coeducational institutions to be listed in professional regis-
tries, such as Who's Who in America, or Who's Who of Ameri-
that cooperative learning improves retention and learning levels of both boys
and girls. Id.
70. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 4; see also WELLESLEY
COLLEGE CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS (1992) [hereinafter WELLESLEY COLLEGE]
(analyzing more than 1200 research studies on girls and boys in public schools);
MYRA & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT
GIRLS (Charles Scribner's Sons, MacMillan Publishing Co. 1994) (documenting
the gender bias girls face in coeducational classrooms and its adverse effects).
71. Susan Estrich, Separate Is Better, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, §t6
(Magazine), at 38.
72. Id.
73. See WELLESLEY COLLEGE, supra note 70, at 89-99. Standardized test
scores may be a reflection of both gender bias and conditions for girls in coedu-
cational schools. Estrich, supra note 70, at 38. Usually about 18,000 boys
reach the top categories on the Preliminary Scholastic Assessment Test
(P.S.A.T.), while only about 8000 girls reach top levels. Id. In 1994, 60% of the
National Merit Scholarship finalists were boys (the P.S.A.T. determines eligi-
bility for the scholarships). Id. Boys also outscore girls on eleven of the four-
teen College Board Achievement tests. Id.
74. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 4.
75. Id.
76. See M. Elizabeth Tidball, Women's Colleges and Women Achievers Revis-
ited, 5 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC'Y 505 (1980).
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can Women.77 Graduates of women's colleges are more than
twice as likely as female graduates of coeducational institu-
tions to have received research doctorates in all fields com-
bined."8 Women's colleges produce far greater numbers of
female graduates included in the Doctorate Record File than
that of coeducational institutions.79 Finally, research has
shown that the larger the proportion of male students on a
campus, the less likely the female students will be recognized
for career achievement.0
Although little quantitative evidence exists regarding the
benefits of single-gender settings to girls at levels before col-
lege,81 the anecdotal evidence strongly supports the propo-
nents of all-girls elementary and secondary schools.82 For ex-
ample, girls who have participated in the Illinois Math and
Science Academy's all-girls calculus-based physics class have
been extremely eager to ask and answer questions instead of
sitting back, hoping that the teacher does not call on them. 3
Generally, officials at all-girls programs are enthusiastic
about the girls' performance and have noticed increased com-
petence and confidence, development of leadership qualities,
and better focus on academics than from girls in coeduca-
tional classes.8 '
However, opponents of single-sex education question the
research done on the subject.8 They charge that much of the
research is merely qualitative or anecdotal and that many of
the results are overstated and presented in a one-sided man-
ner in the course of pursuing a political agenda.8 Many
studies show that boys do in fact perform better than girls in
math, science, and social science, but that girls perform bet-
ter than boys in reading and far better in writing.87
Many of the other arguments against all-female pro-
77. Id. at 506.
78. Id. at 515.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 509.
81. One interesting fact is that in girls' high schools, 80% of the girls take
four years of science and math, compared with the national average of two
years in a coed environment. Estrich, supra note 71, at 38.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 5.
85. Tovey, supra note 27, at 4.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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grams are very similar to those arguments against all-male
schools for minority males.88 Some educators worry that all-
female programs merely reinforce gender stereotypes of fe-
males having special needs, limitations, or deficiencies in
learning.89 Finally, opponents also believe that teacher
training in diversity and equity can also contribute to a bias-
free coeducational classroom."
B. Equal Education Opportunity Act
The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974"' prohibits,
among other things, student assignment to a school other
than a neighborhood school if assignment results in more
segregation of students on the basis of race, color, sex, or na-
tional origin among the schools than would result if such stu-
dents were assigned to the school closest to their homes."
The purpose of the Act was to specify appropriate remedies
for the orderly elimination of vestiges of dual school systems,
such as those racially segregated.93
Thus, while the Equal Education Opportunity Act essen-
tially forbids a school district from making mandatory as-
signments of students to single-gender public elementary and
secondary schools, where the choice of schools is voluntary on
the part of the students, a school district does not violate the
Act.94 Therefore, the Young Women's Leadership School in
Harlem would not violate the Equal Education Opportunity
Act because girls are not assigned to the school, but, rather,
their attendance at the school is voluntary.9
C. Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197296 prohibits
any person, on the basis of sex, from being excluded from
participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to dis-
88. See supra Part II.A.1; GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 6.
89. Tovey, supra note 27, at 4. As an example of this concern, federal offi-
cials suggested that all-girl math classes in a Ventura, California school be la-
beled "classes for the mathematically challenged" in order to comply with Title
IX regulations. Id.
90. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 6.
91. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1994).
92. Id. § 1703(c).
93. Id. § 1701(b).
94. See GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 7 n.8.
95. Steinberg, supra note 6, at B15.
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688 (1994).
[Vol. 381194
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crimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance.97 While Title IX governs ad-
missions policies of vocational, professional, graduate, and
public undergraduate schools, it does not govern admissions
practices at the elementary and secondary school levels.98
Thus, the Title IX statute does not explicitly preclude a
school district from establishing single-gender elementary
and secondary schools, even if it receives federal funds.99
However, Title IX's implementing regulation"' only per-
mits single-gender elementary and secondary schools if com-
parable facilities, courses, and services are made available to
students of both genders. 1 1 In 1992, the Department of Edu-
cation's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), which enforces Title
IX, investigated complaints against two single-gender public
schools, but concluded that neither violated Title IX. 1°2 The
OCR found that despite the school's name, the Philadelphia
High School for Girls had no official policy of excluding males
and, therefore, it had not violated Title IX. 3 The OCR made
similar findings regarding the policies of the all-girls Western
High School in Baltimore.' Boys rarely apply to these
schools because the schools have decidedly female atmos-
pheres in which boys do not seem interested.' Thus, even if
a school consists of members of only one sex, as long as an
elementary or secondary school does not have an official pol-
icy excluding a particular sex from attending a school, the
OCR will not find a violation of Title IX.
0 6
D. Equal Protection History of Gender-Based Classifications
In addition to Title IX, single-gender education has also
been challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 7 which declares that a state may
not deny anyone in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
97. Id. § 1681(a).
98. Id. § 1681(a)(1).
99. Id.
100. 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1996).
101. Id. § 106.35(b).
102. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 7-8.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
105. Mary B.W. Tabor, Planners of New Public School for Girls Are Studying
Two Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1996, at B14.
106. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 7-8.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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laws. 1o8
1. Initial Standard: Rational Basis
Prior to 1971, the courts examined classifications based
on gender under the highly deferential "rational basis" test,
where a statute was upheld if it was rationally related to
some legitimate state objective. °9
2. Reed: Rational Basis with Bite
However, in Reed v. Reed,"' decided in 1971, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously held that in order for
gender classifications to comport with the Fourteenth
Amendment, they "must be reasonable, not arbitrary and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.""' In
Reed, the Court struck down an Idaho statute preferring men
over women as administrators of estates because the classifi-
cation was arbitrary."' The Court rejected the state's conten-
tion that the preference was necessary to reduce the work-
load of probate courts by eliminating hearings on the
merits."' While the Reed Court did not explicitly establish a
new standard or find gender to be a suspect class, the Court
required much more justification for gender-based classifica-
tions than had been previously required and implicitly re-
jected the traditional and highly deferential rational basis
test for gender classifications."'
3. Brief Support for Strict Scrutiny
The rational basis test for gender classifications was ex-
plicitly rejected by the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson."' In
fact, in Frontiero, a plurality of the Court held that classifica-
tions based on gender, like those based on race, were subject
108. Id.
109. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14.3,
at 772-73 (5th ed. 1995).
110. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
111. Id. at 76 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 109, § 14.3, at 778-79.
115. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
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to strict scrutiny."6 However, this position was never for-
mally adopted by a majority of the Court.117
4. Current Standard of Review: Intermediate Scrutiny
Finally, in Craig v. Boren,"8 decided in 1976, a majority
of the Justices agreed upon a specific definition of an inter-
mediate standard of review for gender-based classifications.'
In this case, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma law which
permitted the sale of 3.2% beer to women at age eighteen, but
required males to be twenty-one.12 In applying this new in-
termediate standard, the Court held that to withstand a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, gender-based classifica-
tions "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 12 ' The state attempted to justify the statute on
the grounds that it promoted traffic safety, citing evidence
showing that males ages eighteen to twenty Were arrested
more often for drunk driving and were involved in more car
accidents than females in the same age group. 22 However,
the Court rejected this argument, holding that the relation-
ship between traffic safety and the gender classification was
too tenuous and that the state was merely using "maleness"
as a proxy for drinking and driving."3
Currently, courts still apply the intermediate level of
scrutiny to governmental classifications based on gender.2
The next section of this comment summarizes the major
cases involving single-gender education.
116. Id.
117. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 109, § 14.3, at 779.
118. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
119. Id. at 197.
120. Id. at 192.
121. Id. at 197.
122. Id. at 199-200.
123. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1976). In other words, because
only two percent of males in that age group were actually arrested for drunk
driving, the classification was based upon a stereotype of all males in that age
group being drunk drivers. Id.
124. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 109, § 14.3, at 603.
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E. Equal Protection History of Single-Gender Education
1. Pre-Craig v. Boren Decisions
In Williams v. McNair,"5 decided before the Reed and
Craig decisions, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina held that Winthrop College, a state
supported institution, did not violate equal protection doc-
trine by limiting admission to female students."6 Examining
the gender-based classification under the rational basis test,
the court held that the classification-premised on evidence
showing the positive effects of single-gender education-was
rational." 7 Moreover, the court held that "the Constitution
does not require that a classification 'keep abreast of the lat-
est' in educational opinion, especially when there remains a
respectable opinion to the contrary." 8 The district court also
found that males could attend other institutions in the state
and that there were no special features connected to Win-
throp that made it more advantageous educationally than
other institutions.
2 9
In Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, ° a
female high school student was denied admission to an all-
male academic high school in Philadelphia solely because of
her sex.' The district had established two single-gender
academic high schools: all-boys Central High School and
Philadelphia High School for Girls.12  The federal district
125. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
126. Id. at 138.
127. Id. at 137-38.
128. Id. at 137.
129. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (D.S.C. 1970), af/d, 401
U.S. 951 (1971).
130. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S.
703 (1977). Because this decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme
Court, it is precedential only in the Third Circuit. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION,
supra note 18, at 13 n.17. Female students subsequently brought another suit
under the Equal Protection Clause and were not barred because of materially
inadequate representation by plaintiffs counsel in Vorchheimer. Id. The
Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County ordered the admission of girls to
Central High School because the boys' campus was almost three times larger,
its library had almost twice as many books, its school had a computer room, and
its graduates received almost twice the amount of money for college scholar-
ships as the graduates of Philadelphia High School for Girls. Id. Central High
School is currently coeducational and the girls school does not deny admission
to boys; however, no boys are enrolled. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
131. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 881.
132. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir.
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court found that both schools had excellent reputations for
academic excellence and enrollment in either school was vol-
untary."' The school district also provided coeducational
high schools which offered courses required for college ad-
mission and advanced placement courses.' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the
district court's findings that the admissions requirements, al-
though not gender neutral, did not offend the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. '35 The court declined to treat gender the same as
race and apply strict scrutiny, reasoning that although no
fundamental difference exists between races, differences be-
tween the sexes do exist that may, in limited circumstances,
justify disparity under the law.'36  However, the court also
failed to establish exactly which level of scrutiny it was ap-
plying-rational basis or intermediate scrutiny-because it
stated that the school district would prevail under either
test.'37 Finally, the court noted that the primary "aim of any
school system must be to furnish an education of as high a
quality as feasible.""8 "Thus, given the objective of a quality
education and a controverted, but respected theory that ado-
lescents may study more effectively in single-gender schools,
the policy of the school board here does bear a substantial
relationship."39
2. Post-Craig v. Boren Decisions
Williams and Vorchheimer were decided before the Su-
preme Court ruled in Craig that gender classifications were
to be examined under an intermediate level of scrutiny." ° Al-
though the Supreme Court affirmed both Vorchheimer and
Williams, in neither case did the Court issue a full opinion."'
1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
133. Id. at 882.
134. Id. at 881.
135. Id. at 888.
136. Id. at 886.
137. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir.
1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). However, the court in
Vorchheimer did make reference to a "substantial relationship." Vorchheimer,
532 F.2d at 888.
141. See Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (D.S.C. 1970), affd,
401 U.S. 951 (1971); Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880,
886 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
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The Court did not issue a full opinion on the constitutionality
of single-gender education until 1982 when it decided Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan.142
In Mississippi University for Women, the Court held, by a
vote of five to four, that it was a violation of equal protection
for a state-supported professional nursing program to deny
admission to males solely on the basis of their gender.'43 The
Court stated that because Mississippi maintained no other
single-sex public university or college, "we are not faced with
the question of whether States can provide 'separate but
equal' undergraduate institutions for males and females," as
was the case in Vorchheimer. T' In Mississippi University for
Women, the Court held that a state needs to show an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for classifying indi-
viduals on the basis of gender.45 The state can only meet
that burden by showing that the classification serves
"important governmental objectives" and that the discrimina-
tory means employed are "substantially related" to achieving
those objectives.!" In applying this intermediate level of
scrutiny, the Court held that fixed notions about roles and
abilities of males and females should not be considered. 4 7
The majority also stated the fact "[t]hat this statutory policy
discriminates against males rather than against females does
not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of re-
view." 48
The Court was not persuaded by Mississippi's argument
that its single-sex admissions policy compensated for dis-
crimination against women. 149 Mississippi had failed to show
that women lacked opportunities to obtain nursing training
when the school was originally established or that women
were deprived of such opportunities when Hogan sought ad-
mission. 5 ° The state's policy, rather than compensating for
discriminatory barriers faced by women, tended to perpetu-
ate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively female
142. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
143. Id. at 731.
144. Id. at 720 n.1.
145. Id. at 724.
146. Id.
147. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
148. Id. at 724.
149. Id. at 727.
150. Id. at 729.
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profession.' The policy also failed because the state had not
shown "that the gender-based classification was substantially
and directly related to its proposed compensatory objec-
tive. ,52
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan applied Mississippi University for Women's in-
termediate standard in Garrett v. Board of Education of
School District of Detroit.' In this case, a Detroit school dis-
trict sought to establish three male academies which would
offer special programs in order to address the high unem-
ployment rates, school dropout levels, and homicide among
urban males.5 The plaintiffs contended that these special
programs did not require a uniquely male atmosphere to suc-
ceed and that they also addressed issues females face. Fur-
thermore, the academies did not target only at-risk boys, but
boys from all achievement levels.'
The district court issued a preliminary injunction, ruling
that under the standard set forth in Mississippi University
for Women, the U.S. Constitution prohibits the exclusion of
an individual from a publicly funded school because of his or
her gender, unless the school district can show that the gen-
der-based classification serves an important governmental
objective and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to achieving that objective."5  The
school district failed to carry its burden because the court
found no evidence that the education system was failing ur-
ban males due to the attendance of females.'57 After the in-
junction was granted, the school district agreed to expand the
academies to include girls and to have comparable male-
focused and female-focused classes and activities; thus, the
case never went to trial.158
3. The VMI Decision
Finally, on June 26, 1996, in United States v. Virginia,159
151. Id. at 729-30.
152. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
153. 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1007-08.
158. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 25, at 14-15.
159. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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the Supreme Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's
("VMI") male-only admissions policy violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.16 ° As the only publicly funded single-gender
institution of higher learning in Virginia, VMI pursued its
goal of producing "citizen-soldiers" through an "adversative"
method which featured physical rigor, mental stress, abso-
lute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regula-
tion of behavior, and indoctrination in "desirable values."161
Its cadets live in spartan barracks under constant surveil-
lance, wear uniforms, eat together, and participate in regular
drills.'62
In 1990, a female high school student seeking admission
to VMI filed a complaint with the United States Attorney
General. 16' The United States sued the Commonwealth of
Virginia and VMI alleging that the institute's exclusively
male admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' The district court ruled in fa-
vor of VMI, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal vacated
the judgment and remanded the case.'65 As a result, Virginia
established an alternative program for women known as the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), a state-
sponsored undergraduate program located at the all-female
Mary Baldwin College.'66 VWIL shared VMI's mission to pro-
duce "citizen soldiers;" however, VWIL did not have a mili-
tary format, did not require its students to eat together or to
wear uniforms, and offered only off-campus leadership pro-
grams.6 7 Mary Baldwin's faculty was less credentialed and
was paid less than VMI's, and the school offered only bache-
lor of arts degrees, in contrast to VMI's science and engi-
neering alternatives.6 8 VWIL had an endowment of about
$19 million compared to VMI's $131 million.'69 Nonetheless,
the district court found that Virginia's proposed remedial
plan satisfied equal protection requirements and the Fourth
160. Id. at 518.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. at 522.
163. Id. at 523.
164. Id.
165. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523-26 (1996).
166. Id. at 526.
167. Id. at 526-27.
168. Id. at 526.
169. Id. at 527.
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Circuit affirmed. '
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in part be-
cause the VWIL remedy proposed by the state was not a
comparable single-gender women's institution, but merely a
"pale shadow" of VMI.' Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, followed Mississippi University for Women and held
that Virginia must show at least that the gender discrimina-
tion is substantially related to achievement of an important
governmental interest.' Under what the majority referred
to as "skeptical scrutiny," the state bears the "demanding"
burden of demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive" justifi-
cation for gender-based discrimination. '73 The Court con-
cluded that Virginia had not shown an exceedingly persua-
sive justification for excluding all women from VMI. 7'
Although the Court agreed with Virginia's argument that
single-gender education may benefit some students and that
"diversity among public educational institutions can serve
the public good,"' 5 Virginia failed to show that VMI was ac-
tually established and maintained to further these pur-
poses. '  Moreover, Virginia failed to show that the admis-
sion of women would destroy the adversative method at
VMI.
1
'
77
The Court refrained from ruling explicitly on the consti-
tutionality of single-gender educational programs other than
the one maintained at VMI.' 8 The Court stated, "[w]e do not
question the State's prerogative evenhandedly to support di-
verse educational opportunities. We address specifically and
only an educational opportunity recognized by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals as 'unique'....
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that the majority opinion would result in uncertainty as to
what the appropriate test is for gender classifications.80 He
believed that the term "exceedingly persuasive justification"
170. Id. at 527-28.
171. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 (1996).
172. Id. at 533.
173. Id. at 531.
174. Id. at 534.
175. Id. at 535.
176. Id.
177. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540-46 (1996).
178. Id. at 534 n.7.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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was merely an observation on the difficulty of meeting the
applicable intermediate test, not a formulation of the test it-
self, as he believed the majority was using the term.'
Justice Scalia's dissent criticizes the majority for essen-
tially imposing strict scrutiny on gender classifications with-
out officially adopting that standard.8 ' Justice Scalia recog-
nized that the majority opinion did not absolutely preclude
the establishment of public single-gender schools.'83 How-
ever, because of the heightened level of scrutiny the Court
applied to VMI's gender classification, school districts and
universities would be too fearful of losing court battles to at-
tempt to create such programs.'84
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Court's decisions in the area of single-gender educa-
tion do not give states and school districts enough guidance
in how to implement single-gender schools. Several issues
remain unresolved by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
United States v. Virginia.8 ' The Court did not decide
whether separate but equal facilities for both sexes would ful-
fill equal protection requirements. 8" The Court also has yet
to decide exactly under what circumstances single-gender
schools are permissible. For example, in the future, the
Court might be more accepting of single-gender programs
which benefit females than of those which benefit males.'87
Finally, it is also unclear how the VMI decision will affect
secondary and elementary schools like the Young Women's
Leadership School in New York City. 8
Furthermore, the Court in the VMI case uses ambiguous
language in applying the intermediate level of scrutiny.'89
This may lead states and school districts to believe that the
Court will now apply a higher level of scrutiny to gender
classifications than the traditional intermediate level of scru-
181. Id.
182. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
184. Id.
185. See infra Part IV.C.1-2.
186. See infra Part IV.C.2.
187. See infra Part IV.C.1.
188. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
189. See infra Part IV.A.
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tiny. As a result of the Court's ambiguous language and fail-
ure to resolve important issues, state and school officials will
be discouraged from establishing single-gender schools.
However, these schools should not be discouraged because
the available research seems to indicate that such schools can
have positive effects on the academic performance of both
boys and girls. Moreover, more research is needed on single-
gender education and, therefore, single-gender schools need
to be established in order to perform this research.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Under Equal Protection Doctrine, There Is Not a Higher
Level of Scrutiny for Gender-Based Classifications After
the VMI Decision
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the
majority in the VMI case effectively adopted a strict scrutiny
level of review for gender-based classifications, as the United
States had urged the Court to do.' However, this simply is
not the case. The majority did not raise the level of review of
gender classifications above the traditional intermediate
level.
1. "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification"
Justice Scalia believed that the majority relied too heav-
ily on the term "exceedingly persuasive justification" in
making its ruling.' In other words, Justice Scalia believed
that in determining whether the state had given an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for maintaining VMI's
all-male status, the majority had imposed a level of scrutiny
much higher than the traditional intermediate level of scru-
tiny.92 This new level of scrutiny, according to Justice Scalia,
was tantamount to strict scrutiny.'3
However, Justice Scalia's assertion is incorrect. No-
where in its opinion did the majority state that VMI's gender
classification must be narrowly tailored to promote a compel-
190. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
191. Id. at 597.
192. Id. at 596-98.
193. Id. at 596.
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ling state interest, as the strict scrutiny standard requires."'
In fact, the Court explicitly stated that it was not employing
strict scrutiny when it held that the "heightened review
standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a pro-
scribed classification," under which gender discrimination
would be examined under a strict level of scrutiny.195 The
Court refused to treat gender the same as race and national
origin (both suspect classes) because, "[s]upposed 'inherent
differences' are no longer accepted as a ground for race or na-
tional origin classifications."'96 Rather, the Court found that
there are inherent physical differences between men and
women that are enduring, and, therefore, strict scrutiny
should not apply to state programs which account for those
differences in a constitutional manner. 97
Furthermore, United States v. Virginia was not the first
case in which the Court had used the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification" in describing the intermediate level
of scrutiny for gender classifications. In Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women, the Court held that "the State has fallen far
short of establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
needed to sustain the gender-based classification."'98 In
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,19 a 1994 case concerning gen-
der-based peremptory challenges, the Court again held that
"gender-based classifications require an 'exceedingly persua-
sive justification' in order to survive constitutional scru-
tiny."00 Justice Scalia also wrote a dissenting opinion in
J.E.B., but unlike in VMI, he did not object to the use of the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification."0 ' Thus, the
Court has used the term "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" in several gender discrimination cases prior to the VMI
case. °20  Its continued use does not make gender a suspect
class.
However, as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his con-
194. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 109, § 14.3, at 602.
195. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982).
199. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
200. Id. at 136.
201. Id. at 156-63 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
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curring opinion, by using the phrase "exceedingly persuasive
justification," the majority "introduces an element of uncer-
tainty respecting the appropriate test."203 In the past, this
term has been used as an "observation on the difficulty of
meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test
itself." '0 However, the majority seems to be using the term
as a formulation of the test. As Justice Scalia points out, the
majority uses the phrase nine times, but only uses the tradi-
tional intermediate test twice in making its ruling.0 5
The use of the term "exceedingly persuasive justification"
as a formulation of the intermediate test does not raise the
level of scrutiny applied to gender discrimination cases.
However, school officials could view this term's use in that
manner because of its excessive use in United States v. Vir-
ginia. As a result, they may be discouraged from establish-
ing single-gender schools for fear of losing legal challenges
due to this apparently heavy burden.
Moreover, the phrase has little utility as an observation
on the difficulty of meeting the appropriate test. It is readily
apparent that a substantial relationship to an important
state interest is difficult to prove. Saying that the state must
be exceedingly persuasive adds nothing to the analysis. Be-
cause the term's descriptive value is greatly outweighed by
the confusion its use creates, the term "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" should be not be used in future cases.
2. Stereotypes and Generalizations
Justice Scalia also objected to the majority's finding that
Virginia's justification for excluding women was based on
generalizations and stereotypes regarding women. 20 6  The
majority found that some women would thrive under the ad-
versative model, would be able to meet the physical demands
VMI imposed on its cadets, and would want to attend VMI
given the opportunity.2 7 Women had traditionally been ex-
cluded from VMI because it was assumed that the adversa-
tive method was an inappropriate method for educating most
203. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 559 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 550.
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women.208 However, the Court found that this assumption
was based on stereotypes about the capabilities of women."'
As with the "exceedingly persuasive" requirement, the
Court's suspicion of classifications based on gender stereo-
types is neither new nor does it raise the level of scrutiny ap-
plied to gender classifications. In Craig v. Boren, the Court
refused to allow the state to use status as an eighteen to
twenty year old male to serve as a proxy for drinking and
driving where statistics showed that relatively few males in
that age group were actually arrested for drinking and driv-
ing."1 In J.E.B., the Court prohibited peremptory challenges
based solely on gender.211 The State reasoned that such
challenges were reasonable based on the historical perception
that men might be more sympathetic and receptive than
women to the arguments of a man charged in a paternity ac-
tion.212 The Court held that the state's rationale was not ex-
ceedingly persuasive because it was based on "invidious, ar-
chaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities
of men and women."213 Thus, the Court refused to allow gen-
der to serve as a proxy for juror competence and impartial-
ity.2
14
Similarly, classifications which perpetuate such gender
stereotypes have consistently been viewed with suspicion in
determining whether a substantial relationship to an impor-
tant governmental interest exists. For example, the Court
found that the Mississippi University for Women's ("MUW")
exclusion of men from its nursing school perpetuated the
stereotype that nursing was a female occupation. 15 Thus,
MUW's gender classification was not substantially related to
the school's alleged purpose in excluding men: namely, com-
pensating women for past discrimination in the nursing
field.216
In the VMI case, the Court followed this precedent and
viewed the exclusion of women with "skeptical scrutiny" be-
208. Id.
209. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).
210. 429 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1976).
211. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
212. Id. at 137-38.
213. Id. at 131.
214. Id. at 127.
215. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
216. Id.
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cause it was based on broad generalizations about the capa-
bilities of women in relation to the adversative method. 17
The Court stated that "[g]eneralizations about 'the way
women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most
women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women
whose talent and capacity place them outside the average de-
scription."18 In other words, if some women (not necessarily
most women)219 are willing and able to learn at VMI under
the adversative method, then the State cannot use one's
status as a female as a proxy for inability or incompetence.2
Continuing VMI's policy of excluding women would only
serve to perpetuate those stereotypes.
3. State's Actual Motive
Finally, Justice Scalia further objected to the majority's
insistence that the objective advanced by the State be the
objective that actually motivated the government to establish
the gender classification in the first place.2 Once again, this
requirement is not new to gender discrimination cases." In
Mississippi University for Women, the State justified the ex-
clusion of men from MUW's nursing school as being in fur-
therance of "educational affirmative action" by "compensating
for discrimination against women."23  However, the Court
found that this was not the actual purpose behind the gender
classification because MUW's all-female admissions policy
was formulated in 1884, when remedies for past gender dis-
crimination were not given consideration. 4
In the VMI case, Virginia tried to justify the all-male
status of VMI as being in furtherance of a state policy of
217. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).
218. Id.
219. The Court in J.E.B. stated, "[g]ender classifications that rest on imper-
missible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some sta-
tistical support can be conjured up for the generalization." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
201 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma law that established different drinking
ages for men and women, although the evidence supporting the age differential
was "not trivial in a statistical sense").
220. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).
221. Id. at 579 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. See eg., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-13 (1977); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
223. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 (1982).
224. Id. at 730 n.16.
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"diversity in educational approaches.""' However, the ma-
jority found that this was not the actual state purpose.226
Virginia had established no all-female public universities in
the name of diversity and VMI's policy of excluding women
dated from a time when Virginia neither offered, nor sought
to offer any higher public education to women.2 Thus, fol-
lowing the rationale of Mississippi University for Women, the
Court held that the State's "justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation."
228
In summary, the level of scrutiny applied to gender clas-
sifications has not changed. Courts in gender discrimination
229cases must still apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.
The State has the burden proving that the purpose for the
gender classification is to serve an important governmental
interest and that the purpose is the actual purpose, not one
fabricated at trial. Moreover, the classification must be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of the important gov-
ernmental interest. If the classification is based upon gender
stereotypes or overbroad generalizations, then the State will
fail to establish a substantial relationship. Finally, the term
"exceedingly persuasive" is merely a description of the diffi-
culty of fulfilling the above requirements and not the formu-
lation of the test to be applied. However, due to the confu-
sion that the term "exceedingly persuasive justification"
engenders, it should not be used in future gender discrimina-
tion cases.
B. Legality of Current Attempts at Establishing Single-
Gender Schools
1. Applying Title IX
Lawyers representing the Young Women's Leadership
School have claimed that the United States Department of
225. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
226. Id. at 539.
227. Id. at 535.
228. Id. at 533.
229. The most recent case interpreting the level of scrutiny applied in the
VMI decision is Engineering Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla. Inc. v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 907-08 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1186 (1998), in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Su-
preme Court in the VMI case did not raise the level of scrutiny for gender clas-
sifications above the traditional intermediate scrutiny.
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Education lacks jurisdiction over it because the gender dis-
crimination provisions of Title IX do not cover admissions to
secondary schools. ' ° However, as mentioned earlier in this
comment,"' even though the Title IX statute does not explic-
itly govern admissions to secondary or elementary schools, '32
Title IX's implementing regulation3 3 prohibits gender segre-
gation in such schools, unless comparable facilities, courses,
and services are made available to students of both gen-
ders. '34 Thus, the YWLS cannot expressly deny admission to
boys unless a comparable school is established for any boys
excluded.
Yet, so long as a single-gender school does not have an
official policy of excluding a particular sex, the OCR will not
find a violation of Title IX and the school district can avoid
setting up comparable single-gender schools for both sexes. '
As currently operated, the YWLS would violate Title IX be-
cause it has an official policy of excluding boys and the school
district has failed to establish a comparable all-boys school. 3'
Yet, if the YWLS follows the all-girls high schools in Phila-
delphia and Baltimore and does not officially exclude boys,
then it too would withstand Title IX challenges, even if it
keeps its name and all of its students are girls.
However, this course may eventually force the YWLS to
admit boys, compromising the purpose of the school. Another
alternative would be for the school district to establish a
comparable all-boys school. Provided both schools were
equally funded and had comparable facilities and instructors,
they would both likely withstand challenges under Title IX.
But, this latter course may prove to be economically unfeasi-
ble.
Despite the economic disadvantages of establishing equal
facilities for both genders, California chose this course in or-
230. Fairness and Single-Sex Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at A22.
231. See supra Part II.C.
232. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
233. 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1996).
234. Id. § 106.35(b).
235. See supra Part II.C.
236. As of September 27, 1997, Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew has refused to
admit boys to the school or create an all-boys school nearby, the two compro-
mises offered by the Federal Department of Education to address what it has
tentatively concluded are legitimate civil rights concerns. Fairness and Single-
Sex Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at A22.
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der to avoid challenges to its single-gender schools." 7 Be-
cause California's program provides for dual single-gender
schools, each with equal funding, facilities, staffing, books,
equipment, curriculums, and extracurricular activities,238 it
will likely withstand any future Title IX challenges.
Nonetheless, even if comparable single-gender schools
existed for both boys and girls, if suit were brought against
the YWLS under an equal protection theory, the school dis-
trict would be required to show that the gender classifica-
tions it established were constitutional.
2. Applying Current Equal Protection Doctrine
Although the YWLS has only been challenged under Ti-
tle IX,2"9 it and California's new single-gender schools may, in
the future, also have to fulfill equal protection requirements.
Applying the intermediate standard used in gender discrimi-
nation cases, the YWLS would not likely withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny, unless, like the California program, substan-
tially equal facilities were provided for both sexes.
a. First Prong-Important State Interest
Establishing single-gender schools is an important state
interest for several reasons. For example, the goal of the
YWLS is to provide underprivileged girls a better education
than they would receive in coeducational schools.24 ° Research
shows that females in coed schools do not perform as well
academically as males.2"1 This is most likely due to the fact
that in coed schools female students are called on less than
boys and are often admonished when they do speak up. 42
Many coeducational schools emphasize individualism and
competition. 4" While boys tend to perform better in these
situations, girls tend to perform better in schools which em-
237. Julian Guthrie, S.F. School Launching Single-Sex Classes, S.F.
ExAMINER, Aug. 28, 1997, at Al.
238. Asimov, supra note 10, at Al.
239. Somini Sengupta, East Harlem Dist. Is Considering an All Boys Public
School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B9; Jacques Steinberg, Rights Groups
Seek to Bar Girls-Only School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at B2.
240. Steinberg, supra note 6, at Al.
241. RIORDAN, supra note 27, at 110-11; Tovey, supra note 27, at 4.
242. Estrich, supra note 71, at 39.
243. RIORDAN, supra note 27, at 106-07.
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phasize cooperation.244 All-girls schools emphasize coopera-
tion, give the girls more individual attention, and focus on
courses in which girls traditionally do not perform well (e.g.
math and science).245 Thus, there is a great need for single-
gender schools which address the problems females face in
coed schools. Therefore, establishing all-girls schools like the
YWLS is an important state interest.
Single-gender schools also serve an important state in-
terest when they address the problems urban minority males
encounter in coed schools. Minority males tend to have low
self-esteem"" and extraordinarily high drop-out rates.""
Those who do not drop out tend to be disciplined often and
perform poorly in school.24 1 Many experts point to all-male
schools as a solution to these problems.24 9 For example, these
schools often employ Afrocentric curriculums and use minor-
ity men as role models for the boys.25 Through these meas-
ures, all-male schools aim to improve self-esteem and teach
responsibility for self and others.25 1 Single-gender schools for
urban minority boys also emphasize courses, such as math,
science, and English, in which minority boys do not perform
as well when they are in coeducational settings."' Thus,
given the obstacles urban minority males face in coeduca-
tional schools, establishing all-male schools is an important
state interest.
Furthermore, in regards to males in general, regardless
of socio-economic and racial status, many educators believe
that separating boys and girls in the classroom is an effective
way to minimize distractions that boys (not just urban mi-
nority boys), as well as girls, cause and face every school
day.253 As mentioned above, many boys talk back to teachers
and act out in order to show off to the girls in the class. 54
Eliminating distractions in the classroom and, in turn, im-
proving the education system for all children, both boys and
244. Tovey, supra note 27, at 4-5.
245. See supra Part II.A.2.
246. RIORDAN, supra note 27, at 106-07.
247. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 195.
248. Id.
249. See supra Part II.A.1.
250. McCluskey, supra note 28, at 196.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 197.
253. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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girls, is yet another important state interest.
Finally, much of the research on the subject indicates
that both genders could perform better academically in sin-
gle-gender settings. 5 However, it is unclear that the single-
gender setting itself is the decisive factor accounting for these
students' improved performance.256 Much more research is
needed on the effects of single-gender education. Due to this
fact, establishing single-gender schools in order to study their
effects is another important state interest.
b. Second Prong-Substantial Relationship To An
Important State Interest
The second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test re-
quires the reviewing court to determine whether the impor-
tant state interest in providing a quality education is served
by the gender classification.5 7 To meet this prong, the school
district which established the YWLS must prove that ex-
cluding boys is substantially related to the important state
interest in improving girls' academic performance.
However, because the research on single-gender educa-
tion is not entirely conclusive,5 8 the school district could very
well fail to prove that its gender-based classification is sub-
stantially related to an important state interest. In other
words, because of the lack of conclusive evidence in the area
of single-gender education, excluding boys from the YVLS
may not be substantially related to the important state inter-
est. On the other hand, the only way to achieve more positive
results is to allow more single-gender schools to be estab-
lished and to study their effects on academic performance.
The school district will be able to overcome this problem
by pointing out that the evidence is conclusive that boys re-
ceive much more attention in coeducational schools. 2 9 Fur-
thermore, statistics conclusively show that girls do not do as
well as most boys in math and science classes. 6 9 Thus, a sin-
gle-gender school which excludes boys and emphasizes math
and science is substantially related to the important state in-
255. See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
256. See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
257. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
258. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
259. Estrich, supra note 71, at 39.
260. GAO, PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 4.
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terest in improving the academic performance of females.
Moreover, if the need for more research on single-gender edu-
cation is asserted as the important state interest, then the
establishment of a single-gender school for such a purpose
also bears a substantial relationship.
Finally, the school district will also have to prove that
the gender classification is not based on faulty stereotypes or
broad generalizations about the capabilities or limitations of
the two genders."' The school district runs the risk that the
reviewing court may view the YWLS as being based on the
faulty stereotype that women need special treatment or have
inherent intellectual limitations.262
However, this is an incorrect view of single-gender
schools like the YWLS. Single-gender schools do not provide
special treatment to their students, nor do they view their
students as being limited. Rather, they are established based
on the rationale that coed schools were not providing their
students with the education they needed in order to function
in society. 263 In other words, single-gender schools are not es-
tablished based on the faulty stereotype that their students
are limited. Instead, single-gender schools are appropriately
established based on the fact that the quality of education at
coed schools is limited in specific instances. Thus, as long as
the school district proves that girls were not performing well
academically at the district's coed schools, it will be able to
prove that the YWLS was not established based on faulty
stereotypes of girls, but was established in response to the
severely limited education girls receive in coed schools.
In summary, the YWLS, as currently set up, violates Ti-
tle IX unless the school district also provides a comparable
single-gender facility for boys.2' However, the all-boys school
must be almost exactly equal to the YWLS to satisfy equal
protection requirements.26 School and class size, faculty pay
and credentials, funding, and quality of facilities must all be
substantially equal.266  Otherwise, the reviewing court will
force the YWLS to admit boys.
261. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
262. See supra Part II.A.2.
263. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
264. See supra Part IV.B.1.
265. See infra Part IV.B.2.
266. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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If separate but substantially equal facilities are provided
for both sexes, the school district must still justify its gender
classification to survive an equal protection challenge. Es-
tablishing a single-gender school is substantially related to
the important state interest in improving academic perform-
ance. Much of the evidence on single-gender education shows
the positive results such schools can have on their students.6 '
To the extent that the evidence is not entirely conclusive,268
establishing single-gender schools is substantially related to
the important state interest in discovering more effective
ways of providing education. Finally, single-gender schools
will be upheld as long as the basis for their establishment is
the failure of coeducational environments and not stereotypes
relating to the limitations of females and minorities.
C. Currently Unresolved Issues That May Turn the Tide
Several questions in the area of single-gender education
remain unanswered by the Court's opinion in United States v.
Virginia. The legality of single-gender programs, such as the
Young Women's Leadership School, depends heavily upon
what the answers are to the remaining questions in this area.
1. Are Single-Gender Schools Only Permissible When
They Benefit Females?
The Supreme Court has only ruled on single-gender pro-
grams that in some way involve stereotypes of females. In
Mississippi University for Women, the Court ruled that the
continued exclusion of men from an all-female nursing school
would only perpetuate the stereotype of nursing being a fe-
male's job.6 9 In the VMI case, the Court held that the exclu-
sion of women from VMI was based on a stereotype that
women were not fit for the adversative method.7 ° The Court
reasoned that allowing VMI's exclusionary policy to continue
would only perpetuate that stereotype.2 7 1
In the future, the Court could hold that all classifications
are essentially based on and perpetuate stereotypes of
women. For example, if an institution only admitted females,
267. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
268. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
269. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
270. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).
271. Id.
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the Court might rule that the school was based on and per-
petuated a stereotype of females having certain limitations
and needing extra help. However, it is unlikely that the
Court would invalidate all-female schools in every case. In
United States v. Virginia, the Court stated that "[s]ex classi-
fications may be used to compensate women 'for particular
economic disabilities [they have] suffered.'"2 72 Thus, in the
future, the Court will allow gender classifications where the
State's actual motivation is to help women.
However, the future for all-male schools is uncertain. If
all-male schools are invalidated, a double standard would re-
sult under which all-female schools which do not perpetuate
stereotypes of women are upheld, but, all-male schools would
automatically be held to violate equal protection principles.
There is some precedent to support this position. The Court's
basis for its opinion in Mississippi University for Women was
that the all-female nursing school did not compensate women
for past discrimination, as the State had argued. 73 In fact,
the all-female nursing school was actually committing a dis-
service to women. By excluding men, the nursing school was
perpetuating a stereotype about proper roles for women.2 74
Thus, in Mississippi University for Women, the Court was es-
sentially protecting women's interests, not those of men.
In Garrett v. Board of Education of School District of De-
troit,275 a Detroit school district was enjoined from establish-
ing three all-male academies. 276 The district court found no
evidence that the coeducational environment (i.e., the pres-
ence of girls) resulted in the failure of urban males.277 Fur-
thermore, because girls faced the same types of problems
boys faced in Detroit's coed schools, the school district could
not set up all-male schools without addressing the girls'
needs.278 Garrett illustrates that there seems to be more of an
acceptance of evidence showing the beneficial effects of sin-
gle-gender settings for females, whereas, evidence showing
the beneficial effects of all-male schools, especially for urban
272. Id. at 533 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per
curiam)).
273. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
274. Id.
275. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
276. Id. at 1006.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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minority males, is not as readily accepted. 79
What this means for all-girls schools like the YWLS is
that it will be much easier for them to prove a substantial
relationship to an important state interest than it would be
for an all-boys school. All-female schools will be much more
widely accepted because they seek to improve the position of
females. Yet, they will still have to satisfy Title IX by pro-
viding comparable facilities for males.28° On the other hand,
many all-male schools could be held to be unconstitutional
because they might be viewed as perpetuating gender stereo-
types. Thus, all-male schools will likely be more difficult to
justify under equal protection doctrine, even if substantially
equal facilities are provided for females.
2. Are Separate But Equal Single-Gender Institutions
Constitutional?
Another issue yet to be resolved by the Court is whether
a State or school district may establish a separate but equal
facility in order to avoid equal protection violations. Al-
though the Court has consistently avoided addressing this is-
sue in cases involving gender classifications, it appears that,
theoretically, the "separate but equal" doctrine may be viable
in gender discrimination cases.2"'
For example, in the VMI case, the Court stated that the
Virginia Women's Institute of Leadership ("VWIL") was in no
way equal to VMI and, therefore, did not serve as an ade-
quate remedial measure.282 The Court seemed to imply that if
VWIL were equal to VMI, the exclusion of women from VMI
would not violate equal protection principles. The district
court in Garrett also implied that if the all-male academies
under attack in Detroit had been accompanied by comparable
all-female academies, the all-male programs would not have
been discontinued. 3 Finally, although not decided under the
279. The District Court in United States v. Virginia noted that both men and
women can benefit from a single-gender education, although apparently "the
beneficial effects are stronger among women than among men." United States
v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va. 1991).
280. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
281. The Court's prohibition of the "separate but equal" doctrine in racial
discrimination cases has not yet been extended to gender discrimination cases.
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
282. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 552-53 (1996).
283. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 n.4 (E.D. Mich.
1991).
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same level of intermediate scrutiny applied to gender dis-
crimination cases today, in Vorchheimer, the Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit that an all-boys high school was equal to an all-girls
high school and, therefore, the all-boys high school did not of-
fend the Equal Protection Clause.284
While, in theory, it may be possible to establish separate
but equal single-gender educational facilities, in practice, it
may be almost impossible to achieve sufficient equality to
pass constitutional scrutiny. For example, in United States v.
Virginia, the Court ruled that VWIL was "a pale shadow" of
VMI because VWIL was lacking in obvious, tangible ways
such as faculty, course offerings, funding, facilities, and, most
importantly, a lack of military training.285 However, the
Court also placed a great deal of importance on intangible
factors. For example, the VWIL graduate could not
"anticipate the benefits associated with VMI's 157-year his-
tory, the school's prestige, and its influential alumni net-
work."286 The VWIL student could not have taken advantage
of the numerous benefits of VMI, such as, an influential VMI
alumni network-a network unavailable at Mary Baldwin
College and VWIL. Therefore, given equality in all other ar-
eas, an institution established as a remedial measure could
only achieve substantial equality87 if it was being compared
to a relatively new institution that had not yet built up a
reputation.
Another obstacle to achievement of substantial equality
is what many educators see as a need to implement different
curriculums and teaching methods for boys and girls.288 For
example, if girls learn better under a model which empha-
sizes cooperative learning, all-girls school officials will likely
want to adopt such measures. However, if the all-male
school in that district has adopted a model emphasizing indi-
vidualism and competition, will these schools be considered
equal? In other words, will the courts allow school districts
the flexibility to account for differences in the ways boys and
284. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir.
1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
285. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546-54 (1996).
286. Id. at 550.
287. Id. at 553 (citing the standard established for racial discrimination
cases in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950)).
288. See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
1998] 1219
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
girls learn their best or must the two schools be exactly
equal? This issue is still undecided, but this comment pro-
poses that school districts be given considerable flexibility in
accounting for differences between the two genders' learning
styles and needs.
V. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes that the United States Supreme
Court, given the opportunity, revisit the single-gender educa-
tion issue and clarify several ambiguities remaining from
past decisions.
A. Eliminate Ambiguous Language
The Court needs to eliminate the use of the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification" when applying the in-
termediate level of scrutiny. 89 Because of the ambiguity
caused by the use of the phrase, school districts will be dis-
couraged from establishing single-gender educational pro-
grams. They may conclude that the Court is examining gen-
der-based classifications under a heightened scrutiny which
approaches strict scrutiny. Although this interpretation
would be incorrect, the term "exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation" should be eliminated because it has little utility as a
descriptive device, it creates ambiguity in the law, and its use
will result in less experimentation with single-gender educa-
tion at a time when more research is sorely needed.
B. Create Separate But Equal Educational Facilities
The Court should also rule on the constitutionality of
separate but equal single-gender facilities. In both the VMI
and the Mississippi University for Women cases, the Court
has intimated that it is possible to have separate but equal
facilities,"'° but the lower courts are left with no guidance on
how to make this determination.
Given that true equality is nearly impossible to measure
and achieve,29" ' the Court and the OCR, in overseeing Title IX,
should require substantially equal funding, instructors, and
facilities when comparing boys and girls schools. However,
289. See supra Part IV.A.2.
290. See supra Part IV.C.2.
291. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546-54 (1996).
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the Court and the OCR should also give the schools consider-
able flexibility in deciding the method of teaching their cur-
riculums because boys and girls, oftentimes, learn in differ-
ent ways.292 While girls and boys schools should share basic
curriculums, the Court needs to give single-gender schools a
great deal of latitude in addressing the specific needs of their
students. Thus, if girls need extra help with math and sci-
ence and boys need extra help with reading and writing, then
single-gender schools should be allowed to provide that help
without having to have exactly the same curriculums.
C. Allow All-Male Schools
In the future, the Court should not invalidate all-male
schools if the school district provides a substantially compa-
rable facility for females. Urban minority males face numer-
ous problems in our society.29 Many studies show the posi-
tive effects that single-gender education can have on these
men and boys.294 Moreover, boys tend to create distractions
in coed classrooms which, if eliminated, could be beneficial to
all boys, regardless of race.295 Thus, all-male schools serve
the important state interest of improving education for all
males, not just urban minority males. For this reason, in the
future, the Court should not create a double standard under
which all-female schools are allowed and all-male schools are
invalidated.
V. CONCLUSION
The end result in the VMI case was not incorrect. The
Virginia Military Institute was the only public institution of
higher learning in the state with the adversative method.
VMI unconstitutionally discriminated against women and
perpetuated archaic stereotypes of the two genders. This
comment has not taken issue with the ends reached in that
decision. What is wrong with the case is the means by with
the Court made its ruling. The Court unnecessarily created
confusion in the area of single-gender education by using
useless and ambiguous terminology. It also failed to answer
important questions which need to be answered in order to
292. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
293. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
294. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
295. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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give school officials guidance when implementing single-
gender schools. Schools like the Young Women's Leadership
School need these answers so that they may attempt to ad-
dress important educational problems faced by many stu-
dents in our country.
Tod Christopher Gurney
